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Abstract. Republican candidates often receive between 30% and 40% of the two-way vote share
in statewide elections in Massachusetts. For the last three Census cycles, MA has held 9-10 seats
in the House of Representatives, which means that a district can be won with as little as 6% of the
statewide vote. Putting these two facts together, one may be surprised to learn that a Massachusetts
Republican has not won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1994. We argue that the
underperformance of Republicans in Massachusetts is not attributable to gerrymandering, nor to
the failure of Republicans to field House candidates, but is a structural mathematical feature of the
distribution of votes. For several of the elections studied here, there are more ways of building a
valid districting plan than there are particles in the galaxy, and every one of them will produce a
9–0 Democratic delegation.
1. Introduction
Gerrymandering is the practice of using the formation of districts to create a representational
advantage for some subsets of the population, or to favor certain kinds of candidates. In recent
years, gerrymandering has received increasing levels of attention and public indignation. There
are essentially two indicators that are taken by the public and by many commentators as red flags
for gerrymandering: bizarre shapes and disproportional outcomes. For instance, the enacted 113th
Congressional districting plan in Pennsylvania contained a notorious district nicknamed “Goofy
kicking Donald Duck,” whose contorted shape was taken by many as prima facie evidence of
redistricting abuse. Under this map, Pennsylvania elections exhibited nearly 50-50 splits in party
preference, while Republicans held 13 out of 18 seats, or over 72% of the House representation.
While there is indeed compelling evidence that Pennsylvania was gerrymandered in a partisan
manner [4], this fact is not established by either shapes or disproportions alone. In this paper, we
show that there can also exist benign and structural obstructions to securing representation that
have to do with not just the number of votes but how they are distributed around the state.
This paper is framed to study a riddle about Republican voting patterns in Massachusetts: why
is 1/3 of the vote proving insufficient to secure even 1/9 of the representation? We use a mix of
empirical analysis with real voting data and experiments with generated voting data to answer
the riddle. We show that uniformity itself can block desired representational outcomes for a group
in the numerical minority (like Republicans in Massachusetts), considering both the numbers and
the geometry. Though this is mathematically obvious when taken to an extreme, exhibiting actual
voting patterns with this level of uniformity is a novel finding.
Massachusetts is one striking case in point, but the broader message is that once the rules have
been set, it becomes a scientific question to study the breadth of outcomes left available to the
districters. This case describes a surprising limitation on the power to control the representational
outcome. In other cases, there will be surprisingly wide latitude, or simply a baseline in a non-
intuitive range. We argue that it is only legitimate to compare an observed partisan outcome
against the backdrop of actual possibility.
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2 VRDI
Numerical uniformity. We use the phrase “numerical uniformity” to describe a situation in which
the vote shares across the building-block units are extremely consistent. In Section 2 we examine
the numerical distribution of votes in 13 statewide elections in Massachusetts, showing that for five
of them, the numbers alone make it literally impossible to build a R-favoring collection of towns
or precincts with enough population to be a Congressional district. Because this type of analysis
is run on the numbers only, this result is very strong: no district-sized grouping can be formed,
even without requiring contiguity, compactness, or any other spatial constraint on districting. The
reason is that elections with in which Republicans are locked out exhibit extremely low variance
in the town- and precinct-level voting results. In particular, even in some elections in which a
Republican received 30-40% of the overall vote, his vote share (note: they have all been men)
rarely exceeded 50% in any precinct, leaving not enough R-favoring precincts to assemble into a
grouping of the size of a congressional district.
Geometric uniformity. On the other hand, “geometric uniformity” would describe a situation in
which one’s partisan preference does not correlate strongly to position within the state, reflected
in the absence of partisan enclaves or clusters. In Section 3 we will add a spatial component to our
analysis. Even when it is numerically feasible to collect enough precincts to form an R-favoring
district, the precincts may not be spatially located in such a way that this can be accomplished
in a connected (i.e., contiguous) fashion. We first show visualizations that illustrate the lack
of a Republican enclave in the low-variance elections. These graphics suggest that there is low
correlation between location and partisanship in these Massachusetts elections. To corroborate
this, we compute clustering scores (which measure segregation of Republican votes from Democratic
votes). We find that the actual vote distributions have clustering levels that are similar to those
that would be observed if sprinkling the Republican votes by drawing randomly from a uniform
distribution around the state. This supports the conclusion that geometric uniformity is making a
secondary contribution to the partisan underperformance.
In short, the conclusion is that extreme representational outcomes are not always attributable
to gerrymandering, nor to overly clustered arrangements of voters from either party, which have
sometimes been claimed to force a heavily clustered party to win districts with wastefully high
majorities (via “packing”). On the contrary, in this case Republicans are locked out of represen-
tation because they are insufficiently clustered: here, the main factor responsible for the lockout
of Republicans is actually that the minority party is distributed too uniformly around the state,
both numerically and geometrically. Generally, counterintuitive limitations on representation can
emerge from a complicated interplay of the numerical and spatial distribution of voter preferences.
The effects on representation of the distribution (and not just the share) of votes is a difficult
mathematical question and is richly worthy of further study.
While public observers may expect proportional representation as a matter of fairness, even
seasoned political scientists often measure fairness in terms of other representational indices. For
instance, the efficiency gap, or EG, is sometimes described as measuring parity of wasted votes,
but is fundamentally measuring whether the seat share S is close to 2V − 1/2, where V is the vote
share. The efficiency gap, EG = 2V −S−1/2, is thought to signify a possible gerrymander when its
magnitude is more than 8%. But the Massachusetts data contain five actual vote distributions (Pres
00, Pres 04, Sen 06, Pres 08, Sen 08) for which even an omniscient redistricter with the honorable
goal of EG = 0 could not succeed: not a single one of the quintillions of possible 9-district plans
has an efficiency gap below 11% in any of those five races. This shows that finding a reasonable
baseline to decide when gerrymandering has occurred is a subtler problem than has so far been
appreciated in the public discourse or the political science literature.
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1.1. Data. Massachusetts is made up of 351 jurisdictions known as towns (also written in some
places as townships or municipalities), which has not changed over the timespan covered here. In
this language, cities are a subset of towns. Towns do not overlap, and they completely cover the
state. Each town is subdivided into some number of precincts, ranging in number from 2166 in 2002
to 2174 in 2016 according to the Secretary of State database [7]. Small changes to precincts are
common between elections. In 2016, 125 towns were not subdivided (the town equals 1 precinct),
and at the other extreme, Boston was made up of 255 precincts, followed by Springfield with 64.
Note that precincts are similar but not identical to Voting Tabulation Districts or VTDs, which are
proposed by the Census Bureau every ten years as recommended precincts [8] and are adopted in
a slightly modified form in Massachusetts. The Secretary of State’s office provided us with a VTD
shapefile that reflects the state’s intended precincts in 2010. The Census provides a town shapefile.
After the 2010 Census, the number of Congressional delegates apportioned to MA dropped from
10 to 9 because the state’s population growth did not keep pace with the country’s.
In the tables below, the cast vote data comes from the Secretary of State’s website [7]. They offer
town-level election results back to the year 2000 and earlier, but precinct-level results only back to
2002. For population numbers, town-level population was retrieved from the Census API directly.
Census 2000 population figures were used for elections taking place 2000–2010, and Census 2010
for 2010–2016. The Secretary of State’s shapefile included VTD population numbers, but because
it did not perfectly match with the precincts in the voting tabular data, population was aggregated
up from census blocks to VTDs, and these populations were verified using NHGIS data. We then
prorated election data from towns for each election into these VTDs by assigning each VTD the
proportion of each candidate’s town-wide vote that corresponds to that unit’s proportion of the
town’s area. We note that there is no name-matching used in this process. To assign VTDs to
districts in the currently enacted plan, we used the TIGER/Line shapefiles from the 113th Congress,
rounded onto towns and precincts by areal allocation.
All of our data, together with scripts needed to run the various algorithms described here, can
be found in the public github repositories of the Voting Rights Data Institute [1, 2].
1.2. Setup choices: Election data, number of districts, smallest units, constraints. In
order to illustrate this effects of uniformity observed in real voting data, we run this feasibility
analysis on election results from 13 Presidential and U.S. Senate elections in Massachusetts. We
note that Congressional election results are not considered here because many of the recent races are
uncontested. For example, in the 2016 U.S. House election, 5 out of 9 districts had no Republican
who filed to run [6]. Therefore, two-way vote share analysis would not be meaningful for these
races.1 We will also choose to analyze the seat share possible out of nine Congressional districts for
the sake of consistency, even though our timespan of electoral data includes a period over which the
apportionment varied between 9 and 10. Neither decision blunts the impact of the findings, which
study the extent to which patterns in real voting data can restrict the range of representation that
is possible for a group in the numerical minority.
In the numerical feasibility section we will only require that districts hew close to the standard of
equal population and that they are made of whole units, sometimes towns and sometimes precincts.
Contiguity of districts and other shape constraints will only be discussed in the geometric section
of the paper. Because of the importance of real voting data for this analysis, we must use precincts
as the smallest building blocks, since that is the smallest level at which vote returns are available.
In practice, the 2011 Congressional plan held 2119 precincts intact while splitting 32, which means
that fewer than 1.5% were split.
1U.S. Senate voting patterns are well known to be more closely correlated with Congressional preferences than
Presidential votes, but that is somewhat beside the point for this analysis, which is focused on the range of represen-
tational outcomes that are possible for given observed partisan voting patterns.
4 VRDI
Using towns or precincts as unsplittable building blocks does have some precedent in law and
practice. As a historical matter, the state Constitution of Massachusetts did require in Article XVI
that state councillors be elected from contiguous districts that keep intact towns and city wards
[5], but this system of councillors is now obsolete. There is a still-active contiguity requirement for
state legislative districts, and a rule to preserve towns as much as is “reasonable,” but no formal
contiguity or unit-preservation requirement for congressional districts. In fact, only 23 states have a
contiguity requirement for congressional districts, while 49 require contiguity for legislative districts.
Nonetheless congressional district contiguity is essentially universal in practice.2
Acknowledgments. We gratefully acknowledge the Bose Research Grant and PI Justin Solomon
for major support of the Voting Rights Data Institute. We thank Gabriela Obando and William
Palmer at the MA Secretary of State’s office for their help collecting and interpreting data. Thanks
also to Jowei Chen for sharing a dataset that approximates precinct-level vote counts in 2000, to
Gary King for extremely useful feedback, and to Max Hully and Ruth Buck for excellent data
support.
2. Arithmetic of Republican underperformance
In this section, we describe a method to determine theoretical bounds on the number of districts
with a Republican majority, given only the geographical units, their population, and their vote
totals for D and R candidates in a particular election. For this part of the analysis we impose no
spatial constraints at all; we do not even require contiguity, but would allow a district constructed
out of an arbitrary collection of towns or precincts from around the state. We show, for example,
that even though George W. Bush received over 35% of the two-way vote share against Al Gore,
it is mathematically impossible to construct a collection of towns, however scattered, with at least
10% of the population and where Bush received more collective votes than Gore. (See Figure 4.)
Election R Share R Share by Town R Share by Precinct
mean variance mean variance
Pres 2000 35.2% 39.70% .0074 – –
Sen 2000 25.4%∗ 29.15% .0044 – –
Sen 2002 18.7% 20.29% .0020 17.43% .0028
Pres 2004 37.3% 40.00% .0093 34.53% .0140
Sen 2006 30.6 % 33.24% .0077 27.59% .0119
Pres 2008 36.8% 39.00% .0117 33.80% .0181
Sen 2008 32.0% 34.40% .0094 28.87% .0142
Sen 2010 52.4% 53.79% .0202 47.71% .0310
Pres 2012 38.2% 41.06% .0146 34.91% .0228
Sen 2012 46.2% 49.20% .0169 42.70% .0275
Sen 2013 44.9% 48.89% .0217 41.89% .0312
Sen 2014 38.0% 41.15% .0141 34.28% .0206
Pres 2016 35.3% 40.18% .0165 33.12% .0236
Table 1. Statistics of Republican two-way vote share in 13 statewide elections in
Massachusetts. Lower-variance elections are marked in red. (* Libertarian vote
share included with R in 2000 Senate race)
2District contiguity can be made somewhat complicated by water and by smaller geographic units that are them-
selves disconnected, but these issues are relatively easy to resolve in Massachusetts. Districting rules may be found
in the state constitution [5] and at http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-MA.php.
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Remark (The Boston Effect). Note that in Table 1 the town-level mean R share reliably overshoots
the statewide R share, while the precinct-level mean errs in the other direction. Recall that there are
351 towns in the 2016 election, subdivided into 2174 precincts. Boston is composed of 255 precincts;
Springfield has 64; and most other towns have fewer than 25 precincts, with 125 towns (more than
a third) having only one. This means Boston is an outlier in size, and it is also an outlier in the
lopsidedness of its Democratic voting majority. (In the 2016 Presidential election, Boston had only
a 14.7% R two-way vote share.)
The town-level averaging underweights Boston because it is weighted equally to tiny towns like
Gosnold (population 75). The precinct-level results overweight Boston because its average precinct
population is under 2500, lower than the statewide average of over 3000. (Exact figures vary year to
year.) This accounts for the direction of error in the mean of each statistic relative to the statewide
(naturally population-weighted) share.
As the table illustrates, the elections from 2000 to 2008 had consistently lower variance in their
town- and precinct-level vote shares than can be observed since 2010. Below, we will connect that
to the representability of Republicans across these elections.
2.1. Numerical feasibility of R districts. Let’s first review the limitations on the power of
gerrymanderers that are produced by the numbers alone. We begin with very simplified algebraic
bounds. In an abstract districting system with equal vote turnout in its districts, if Party X receives
share 0 ≤ V ≤ 1 of the vote, its possible seat shares are constrained to a range, with the actual
outcome depending on how the votes are distributed across the districts. At its most ruthlessly
efficient, Party X could in principle have barely more than half of the vote in certain districts and no
vote in the others, thus earning seat share up to 2V , or twice its vote share. At minimum, a party
with less than half of the vote can be shut out entirely by having less than half of each district; if
Party X has more than half of the vote, then its opponent has a vote share of 1−V and a maximum
seat share of 2(1− V ) = 2− 2V , so the minimum seat share for Party X is 1− (2− 2V ) = 2V − 1.
For example, a party with 40% of the vote can get anywhere from 0 − 80% of the seats, while a
party with 55% of the vote can get anywhere from 10 − 100% of the seats. This naive analysis
would project that districters could in principle arrange for Beatty voters in the 2008 Senate race
to convert their 32% of the votes to 0− 64% of the seats.
But the naive analysis does not take into account constraints introduced by the fixed number of
districts, by the variation in turnout, or by the discreteness of the building blocks. The feasibility
analysis in this section does account for all of those factors. Table 2 shows that in Ed Markey’s
2013 special election to the Senate, his opponent’s pattern in obtaining 38% of the vote could not
have earned him any more than three district wins out of nine, no matter how the districts were
drawn, despite the naive bounds that suggest up to six district wins could have been possible. And
even more strikingly, though Jeff Beatty earned nearly a third of the vote against Kerry in the
Senate race of 2008, Beatty voters in that distribution are actually locked out of representability
entirely. The actual observed turnout patterns, and the effect of the mandate to build districts
out of intact precincts, have lowered Beatty’s ceiling from 5 districts out of 9 all the way to zero.
Smaller building blocks should mean more flexibility, but shrinking the building blocks from towns
to precincts didn’t in this case help Beatty at all.
Here is our method for measuring feasibility in our setup. Suppose that the ideal district size
(state population divided by number of districts) is denoted by I. Then we will declare that it
is numerically feasible for a party to get n seats in a certain election if there exists a collection
of units (towns or precincts) with population at least nI and in which that party has a majority
of the two-way vote share. A feasibility bound for the party is the largest such n that has been
demonstrated.
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By contrast, we will say that it is numerically infeasible for a party to get m seats in a given
election if there is proven to be no collection with population at least mI and a majority for the
party. An infeasibility bound is the smallest such m that has been demonstrated.
We use a simple sorting algorithm to get feasibility and infeasibility bounds for the elections
considered here, presenting the results in Table 2. Often, but not always, the algorithm will
produce tight bounds, in the sense that the infeasibility bound is one more than the feasibility
bound.3
Our procedure is simply to greedily create the largest R-majority collection possible from the
chosen geographic units (in our case, towns or precincts) by including them in order of Republican
margin per capita:
δ/p = (#R votes−#D votes)/(census population of unit).
The proof supporting this test of feasibility is shown in the appendix, §4.
We will carry out the analysis below fixing the number of districts at 9 throughout, which is the
Congressional apportionment at the current time. This means that ideal district size is I = 705, 455
for races before 2010 and I = 727, 514 for races after 2010.
Election D Candidate–R Candidate R Share Seat Quota R Feas/Infeas D Feas/Infeas
(9 seats) town prec town prec
Pres 2000 Gore–Bush 35.2% 3.2 0/1 — 9/- —
Sen 2000 Kennedy–Robinson/Howell 25.4%∗ 2.3 0/1 — 9/- —
Sen 2002 Kerry–Cloud 18.7% 1.7 0/1 0/1 9/- 9/-
Pres 2004 Kerry–Bush 37.3% 3.4 1/2 1/2 9/- 9/-
Sen 2006 Kennedy–Chase 30.6 % 2.8 0/1 0/1 9/- 9/-
Pres 2008 Obama–McCain 36.8% 3.3 1/2 1/2 9/- 9/-
Sen 2008 Kerry–Beatty 32.0% 2.9 0/1 0/1 9/- 9/-
Sen 2010 Coakley–Brown 52.4% 4.7 9/- 9/- 8/9 8/9
Pres 2012 Obama–Romney 38.2% 3.4 3/4 3/4 9/- 9/-
Sen 2012 Warren–Brown 46.2% 4.2 7/9 7/8 9/- 9/-
Sen 2013 Markey–Gomez 44.9% 4.0 7/9 7/8 9/- 9/-
Sen 2014 Markey–Herr 38.0% 3.4 3/4 3/4 9/- 9/-
Pres 2016 Clinton–Trump 35.3% 3.2 2/3 3/4 9/- 9/-
Table 2. If districts were to be made out of towns or out of precincts, with no
regard to shape or even connectedness, how many R or D districts could be formed?
Feasibility and infeasibility bounds are shown in this table. Low-variance elections
(see previous table) are marked in red. Election winners shown in boldface; R share
is with respect to 2-way vote; seat quotas are proportional share of 9 seats.
We can make several observations from the table. Moving to finer granularity of building blocks
did not have any impact on the feasibility bounds for most elections. In two cases (Sen 2012 and
Sen 2013), the precinct level bounds are sharper. In both cases, a Republican-performing grouping
of towns can be made with size 7I but our method produces an inconclusive result about a grouping
of size 8I. With precincts, we find that the uncertainty is eliminated and a grouping of size 8I is
impossible. The 2016 Presidential election is the only one for which the finer granularity has shifted
the feasibility bounds. It is not possible to find scattered towns totaling three districts’ worth of
3It is possible that the feasibility bound actually overstates the number of districts that can be built with a majority
for the designated party—because the collection of size nI may not be splittable into n appropriate collections of size
I—but any infeasibility bound reflects a mathematically proven impossibility, which drives all the conclusions in this
section.
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population which collectively favor Trump over Clinton, but it becomes possible if precincts are the
building blocks. So in that case, it becomes narrowly possible to achieve proportional representation
for Trump voters; note, however, that this still falls far short of the seven Trump districts that the
simple analysis would have predicted to be accessible by extreme gerrymandering.
2.2. Numerical uniformity: The role of variance. In statistics, the mean of a set of numerical
data records its average value, and the variance (or second central moment) tells you how spread
out the values are around this mean. We claim that variance in the vote share of a minority group
(here, Republicans) can be a primary explanatory factor for poor representational outcomes in
districting. At one extreme, this is obvious: if the variance is zero, then the preferences in the state
are completely uniform, and every single unit has the same 35% (say) of Republican votes. In this
case, we can easily see that districting has no impact at all: every possible district will also have
35% R, and so will be won by Democrats.
Notably, the Gore/Bush election in 2000 had a two-way R vote share of 35.2% and results in zero
possible R-majority districts. Meanwhile the Clinton/Trump election had a nearly identical 35.3%
R vote share but produces the possibility for as many as two districts with a Trump majority.
Figure 1. These histograms show the distribution of Republican vote share by
town in the 2000 and 2016 MA Presidential contests, illustrating elections with very
nearly the same mean but different levels of variance. These two elections have
town-level variance .0074 and .0165, respectively.
The fundamental impact of variance should be clear from the figures. A low-variance election
with a minority of R votes may have very few units with R share over .5, which are precisely the
building blocks needed to form an R-majority district.
Looking back to Table 2 corroborates this finding: 7 out of 13 elections exhibit a mathematical
impossibility of representation or fall at least two seats short of proportionality—completely inde-
pendent of the choices made by districters. These are precisely the seven elections in which the vote
totals show lower variance, both at the town level and the precinct level. In five of the elections,
this effect is so pronounced that the minority party is completely locked out of any possibility of
representation.
2.3. Varying variance. To account for these outcomes, we generated datasets with similar mean
vote share to the 2000 and 2016 Presidential elections, adjusting the variance of R-share per unit
while maintaining voter turnout and population at actual levels. We assigned R two-way vote
shares chosen from a truncated skewed normal distribution with a set mean of 35.25% (the average
of the Gore/Bush and Clinton/Trump R vote share) and variances ranging from 0.0020 to 0.0320,
covering the range actually observed in Table 1.4 From those datasets, we reran our procedure to
produce bounds on the number of possible R seats.
4We used the scipy python library skewnorm.rvs function to generate random numbers from a skewed normal
distribution with the chosen location, scale, and shape variable. Truncation means that any value outside of the [0, 1]
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Figure 2. Skewed truncated normal distributions are shown here with the same
mean and different variance as the observed results. These were used to generate
election data to test the hypothesis that vote datasets with higher variance would
achieve higher levels of numerically feasible representation.
The results, plotted in Figure 3, strongly corroborate the hypothesis that feasible representation
is directly controlled by variance in vote share. In fact, a high enough variance can be seen to make
it numerically feasible to overperform proportionality.
Figure 3. Higher-variance datasets reliably produce greater numbers of feasible
seats, even with the vote share held constant. This figure shows the results of three
trials with the protocol described above; the results are visually indistinguishable.
3. Geometry of Republican underperformance
We now consider the spatial aspects of the vote distribution with respect to the possibilities for
district formation.
3.1. Lack of Republican enclaves. Compounding the numerical effects described above is the
spatial scatter of the areas preferring Republicans in Massachusetts. To illustrate this, consider
forming a grouping of towns by collecting them in order of their R margin per capita δ/p, as above,
until the collection is large enough to be a valid district. The result is a dramatically discontiguous
assemblage spanning nearly the full state. A similar pattern can be observed in 2006 Senate returns.
range was replaced by another value drawn from the same distribution. This truncation process changes the mean
and variance of the distribution being produced, so we ran it iteratively, adjusting the mean and variance until the
desired parameters were produced. Throughout, a shape variable of −8 was selected to best capture the observed
distributions in historical elections. The resulting distributions can be seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 4. This figure shows the district-sized collection of towns most favorable to
George W. Bush in the 2000 Presidential race (left), and the collection of precincts
most favorable to Kenneth Chase in the 2006 Senate race (right). These “districts”
still preferred Gore and Kennedy, respectively.
In fact, very few of the building blocks shown in the picture are R-favoring at all. Only 31 out
of 351 towns had a G.W. Bush majority in 2000, and the largest Bush-favoring collection of towns
only has population 426,304, well short of ideal district size of over 700,000. (Its Bush majority
has a one-vote margin.) Similarly, only an astonishing 9 of 2166 precincts in 2006 record a Chase
majority.
3.2. Clustering. The voting data used here makes it possible to test whether, in addition to in-
creased variance, the election results after 2010 exhibit more spatial clustering than before. To
assess this we use an index called a capy (or clustering propensity) score, which resembles assor-
tativity scores in network science. (See [3] for a comparative survey of scores of clustering and
segregation.)
The geographical units that make up a jurisdiction have populations of different sizes and compo-
sitions. In geographical unit vi, we use xi and yi to denote the populations from group X and group
Y in that unit. We record the X population data as an integer-valued vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) record-
ing each unit’s population, and likewise write y for the Y population figures. If unit vi has a shared
boundary of positive length with unit vj , we write i ∼ j. Then let 〈x,y〉 :=
∑
i
xiyi+
∑
i∼j
xiyj+xjyi.
The idea is that 〈x,y〉 is a close approximation to the number of individuals of X type living next
to an individual of Y type, either in the same geographical unit or in neighboring units.5 With
this, we define
H(x,y) :=
1
2
( 〈x,x〉
〈x,x〉+ 〈x,y〉 +
〈y,y〉
〈y,y〉+ 〈x,y〉
)
.
By construction, this score varies from 0 to 1 and measures the tendency of each of the two kinds
of population to live next to another member of their own group, rather than the other. In a
sufficiently large network, a perfectly uniform distribution where the xi and the yi were constant
would earn a score approaching H = 1/2, and a perfectly clustered distribution where the xi = 0
in one region and the yi = 0 in the complementary region would tend towards H = 1.
Table 3 shows the observed H(R,D) clustering results for Republican compared to Democratic
voters. For each election, we create two comparison points by experiment: the uniform H score is
the highest score recorded in 30 trials in which Republican voters were scattered randomly under a
uniform distribution until reaching the statewide R share observed in that election. The clustered H
score is produced by applying a dynamical step that moves votes into a configuration with higher
5This approximation approaches equality as the populations get large. For details, see [3].
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Election R Share uniform H observed H clustered H
Pres 2000 35.2% .5001 .5135 .9456
Sen 2000 25.4%∗ .5000 .5063 .9374
Sen 2002 18.7% .5001 .5035 .8982
Pres 2004 37.3% .5000 .5182 .9351
Sen 2006 30.6% .5001 .5171 .9537
Pres 2008 36.8% .5000 .5210 .9591
Sen 2008 32.0% .5000 .5181 .9513
Sen 2010 52.4% .5001 .5329 .9587
Pres 2012 38.2% .5000 .5243 .9268
Sen 2012 46.2% .5000 .5272 .9597
Sen 2013 44.9% .5002 .5366 .9492
Sen 2014 38.0% .5001 .5276 .9557
Pres 2016 35.3% .5000 .5344 .9480
Table 3. Clustering scores for Republican versus Democratic voters at the town
level in each of the elections discussed in this paper. We show the scoreH = H(R,D)
for a uniform trial, the observed votes, and a highly clustered distribution of voters,
each with the statewide share that corresponds accurately to the given election. The
numbers are truncated (not rounded) after four decimal places.
tendency for neighbors to have the same vote.6 As a general matter, we see that the H scores
closely resemble the uniform trials, and that there is no significant trend in the H scores over time.
In some cases, there are interesting comparisons, such as in comparing the Presidential outcomes
in 2000 and 2016—there, we can see that Trump voters are appreciably more clustered than Bush
voters were. We conclude that clustering may have a secondary effect on representability, but in
a direction that runs counter to the conventional wisdom: the prospects of the minority party for
representation get better, not worse, when the voters are more tightly spatially clustered.
We note also that there is a one-way relationship between numerical and geometric uniformity:
if there is low variance in observed partisan shares by unit, then all units tend to have the same
shares, so there is necessarily no spatial pattern to partisan preference. However, high variance
in partisan share can occur in a way that is strongly spatially patterned (such as if there are
pronounced enclaves) or in a way that is not (such as if there is a checkerboard pattern of strong
support for each party). The findings here strongly support a conclusion that numerically uniform
vote patterns create obstructions to representation for a group in the numerical minority. Further
work is needed to study the spatial determinants of representability in the high-variance case.
In closing, we reiterate the main lesson of this simple study: the range of possible representational
outcomes under valid redistricting is controlled by the numerical and geometric/spatial distribution
of voter preferences, and by the local rules of redistricting, in an extremely complex way that
one-size-fits-all normative ideals fail to capture. The mathematical challenges of identifying the
representational baseline are considerable, but there is significant recent progress in that direction.
Any meaningful finding of gerrymandering must be demonstrated against the backdrop of valid
alternatives—under the constraints of law, physical geography, and political geography that are
actually present in that jurisdiction.
6This is called the Ising model, and code can be found in our github repo [2].
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4. Appendix: Rigorous feasibility bounds
Suppose you have a list of units with corresponding populations pi and R margins δi (number
of R votes minus number of D votes). Re-index so that they are ordered from greatest to least by
margin per capita:
δ1/p1 ≥ δ2/p2 ≥ · · · ≥ δn/pn.
We will call a collection of units S a grouping, and let p(S) and δ(S) be its population and R margin,
found by summing the pi and δi for its units. Let Dk be the grouping indexed by {1, . . . , k}. Let K
be the smallest integer k for which δ(Dk) ≤ 0. This means that DK−1 has a collective R majority,
but if you add the Kth unit you get a grouping DK that fails to have an R majority.
Theorem 1. With the notation above, let M be any positive integer.
Case 1. M ≤ p(DK−1). There exists an R-majority grouping of size at least M .
Case 2. p(DK−1) < M ≤ p(DK). Inconclusive: such a grouping may or may not exist.
Case 3. p(DK) < M . There does not exist an R-majority grouping of size at least M .
Proof. In Case 1, it is clear that a Republican grouping can be created, because DK−1 is a
Republican-majority grouping of sufficient size.
We present examples to illustrate that Case 2 is inconclusive.
i ri di pi δi/pi
1 8 0 8 1
2 1 9 10 −4/5
3 0 5 5 −1
i ri di pi δi/pi
1 8 0 8 1
2 1 9 10 −4/5
3 0 8 8 −1
For both examples, fix M = 13. We have K = 2 in both examples because δ(D1) = 8 > 0 and
δ(D2) = 0. Both fall under Case 2 because p(D1) = 8 and p(D2) = 18, while M = 13. In the left
example there exists an R-majority grouping, made by putting together units 1 and 3 to form a
grouping with δ = 3 and population 13. But in the right example there is none, which is easily
confirmed by considering all of the combinations.
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Finally, in Case 3, we have p(DK) < M .
Claim. Let S = DK and suppose that p(S) < M . Then for any S
′ ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
p(S′) > p(S) =⇒ δ(S′) < δ(S).
The claim asserts that DK has the optimal R margin among all groupings with at least as much
population. Since we seek a grouping larger than p(DK) and since δ(DK) ≤ 0, this implies that a
R-majority grouping cannot be formed. So it just remains to prove the claim.
Let A = S′ \ S and R = S \ S′ denote the sets of indices added to and removed from S,
respectively, to make S′. Since A and R are disjoint, and we have assumed that p(S′) > p(S), it
follows that p(A) > p(R). Let µ = max{ δipi | i ∈ A} and let µ′ = min{
δi
pi
| i ∈ R}. Note that, since
R ⊆ S = {1, . . . ,K} and A ⊆ Sc = {K+1, . . . , n} and the δipi are non-increasing, we have µ ≤ µ′.
Note that every unit i 6∈ S has a Democratic majority (δi < 0). This is because Republican-
majority units are added to S in decreasing order of δipi until the overall δ ≤ 0, so by construction
every unit with a Republican majority is in S. It follows, since A ⊆ Sc, that µ < 0.
We have µ · p(R) > µ · p(A) because p(R) < p(A) and µ < 0. Also, µ′ · p(R) ≥ µ · p(R). So,
transitively, µ′ · p(R) > µ · p(A).
Note that
µ′ · p(R) =
∑
i∈R
µ′ · pi ≤
∑
i∈R
δi
pi
· pi = δ(R).
Similarly µ · p(A) ≥ δ(A). Combining our inequalities, we have shown that δ(R) > δ(A). It follows
that δ(S) > δ(S′), as claimed. This completes the proof of the claim and the theorem. 
Note that Case 2, the inconclusive situation, is more likely when there are units that are large
relative to the population threshold, because the gap between p(DK−1) and p(DK) is the population
of the Kth unit. So if we consider the formation of districts, we are more likely to get an inconclusive
result with large units like counties or towns and less likely with smaller units like blocks or
VTDs/precincts.
This theorem suggests an algorithm for computing feasibility bounds that is no more complex
than sorting, which makes it fast and efficient. The answers are not completely satisfying, however,
because of the possibility of an inconclusive finding (Case 2) and because the existence of a grouping
with an R majority and population that is m times the size of an ideal district does not imply that
it can be split into m sub-groupings of equal size, each with R majorities. However, a refined
algorithm that could close those loopholes is known to have forbidding computational complexity,
because it is equivalent to the 0− 1 knapsack problem, which is known to be NP-complete. 7
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knapsack_problem#Definition
